Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’ offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning (...) systems. We adopted this approach to evaluate the implicit–explicit distinction in the context of a simple task in which outcomes were probabilistically caused by actions. In line with our initial predictions, we found evidence of a dissociation. We discuss the implications of this result for theories of sense of agency. (shrink)

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.

Physiological concentrations of retinoic acid can induce acute alterations in the expression of the enzyme tissue transglutaminase in cultured macrophages. The induction of this enzyme offers a probe to study the mechanism of retinoid action in both normal and leukemic cells.

Though John Stuart Mill's long employment by the East India Company did not limit him to drafting despatches on relations with the princely states, that activity must form the centrepiece of any satisfactory study of his Indian career. As yet the activity has scarcely been glimpsed. It produced, on average, about a draft a week, which he listed in his own hand. He subsequently struck out items that he sought to disown in consequence of substantial revisions made by the Company's (...) directors or the Board of Control. He also listed items that achieved publication as parliamentary papers and they amount to about ten per cent of his drafts. The two lists, published in the most recent volume of his Collected Works, reveal, at the least, the ‘political’ despatches from which he did not seek to dissociate himself. The despatches were not entirely his work and authorship in the conventional sense may not be assumed. They were the product of an elaborate process, in which many hands were engaged. At worst, they were his work in much the same way that an Act of Parliament is the work of the Crown Solicitor who drafts the bill. At best they were his as are the drafts of a civil servant who believes in policy statements that he prepares for his political masters. The greatest English philosopher and social scientist of the nineteenth century was, in his daily occupation, an employee. His Company was charged with initiating policies for the Indian states and they were subject to the control of a minister of the Crown. (shrink)

For 2,000 years all Buddhist states were absolute monarchies. Between 1850 and 1950 every Buddhist state abandoned absolute monarchy and embraced some form of constitutional, representative government. This chapter examines whether this change was a cynical abandonment of the Buddhist tradition or a defensible reinterpretation of the earlier texts, by looking at how the transition from monarchy to republicanism took place in the several Buddhist-majority countries whose governments were explicitly Buddhist. It concludes that the transition was a bit of both, (...) to different degrees in the various nations, that traditional Buddhist political theory was monarchist but had some republican elements, and that Buddhist political theory today possesses resources helpful for the future. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the moral/ethical system of early Buddhism is best understood as being both naturalistic and irrealist/antirealist. It is naturalistic because it excludes all supernatural forces and explains morality/ethics in terms of natural facts. It is irrealist/antirealist because it consists of hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. The chapter examines both primary texts and contemporary scholarship. It then argues that the Buddhist theory of ethics is very similar to the immanence/immanentist theory of William Connolly, and that such theories (...) may be uniquely helpful in creating stable political cooperation in pluralistic societies. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the three elements of Buddhist political theory—the doctrine of anattā /no-self, the theory of limited citizenship, and the theory of ethical naturalism and irrealism/anti-realism—are both similar to Western theories and different from them in important ways. Further, it argues that the three elements go together logically—if we assume that people are selves, it makes sense to ask whether they have rights and duties, and if so whether those are expressed through politics. Conversely, if we assume that (...) people are not selves, the questions of ethical realism and of robust citizenship may never arise. Finally, it argues that the Buddhist approach helps to clarify and resolve some problems in Western thought, such as the apparent impossibility of autonomy. (shrink)

The introduction argues that Western political theory has overlooked the political philosophy of Buddhism, and that it would benefit from engaging with Buddhism as a political theory. The Buddhist political philosophy rests on three ideas, which are both similar to and different from the concerns of Western scholars: that human beings are not selves; that politics is necessary but not very important; and that moral norms are advice for wise living rather than categorical obligations. The introduction summarizes the author’s understandings (...) of political theory and Buddhism generally, and argues that Western political theorists stand to benefit from learning more about Buddhism. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the Buddha and Friedrich Nietzsche have very similar theories about the self. Both agree that there is no metaphysical self—no soul or permanent personal essence. Both agree that false beliefs about the self are the primary cause of personal and social conflict. But whereas Nietzsche concludes that we must always believe that we are a self, even as we continuously try to overcome its particular content and limitations, the Buddha argues that we can let go of (...) the idea of being a self altogether and that we would be much better off if we did so. (shrink)

This chapter examines the political theory found in the primary texts of early Buddhism and related contemporary scholarship. It argues that the early texts contain both a theory of government, which endorses enlightened monarchy based on a primitive social contract, and a political theory, which rests on the ideas that human beings are not selves, that politics is necessary but not very important, and that moral norms are advice rather than absolute duties. This reading directly contradicts the long Western tradition (...) of seeing Buddhism as anti-political. It also argues that modern readings of the Buddhist political tradition as republican are mistaken. (shrink)

Buddhism acknowledges that politics and government are inevitable, necessary, and helpful but also argues that they are relatively unimportant compared with the primary human goal of enlightenment. This theory of “limited citizenship” has parallels in the Western theories of Epicurus, Henry David Thoreau, and John Howard Yoder. The Buddha’s practical advice to citizens is to fulfill the basic/customary duties of citizenship but otherwise to put little time or energy into politics and government. The chapter considers various criticisms of this view (...) of citizenship, and ultimately argues that the Buddhist or “limited citizenship” approach is not only defensible, but may be superior to more familiar theories that require an unrealistic level of political engagement from ordinary citizens. (shrink)

This chapter examines the primary texts relevant to political theory from the traditional period of Buddhism. It argues that the traditional-period texts largely continue the early period’s theory of more-or-less absolute monarchy with a relatively enlightened king, while also seeking to connect the mythological first king to the Buddha, and contemporary kings both to the Buddha and the first king. The texts of this period attempted to sacralize kingship and reduce the differences between the spiritual and temporal realms. These texts (...) also demonstrate a remarkable unity, despite being produced over a long period of time, in many different locations, by authors identified with various sects of Buddhism. (shrink)

In this response, I dispute Professor Narbonne’s thesis on the literary leeway of the poet, emphasizing the constraints on poetic license from both the nature of the genre and the ethical and educational role tragedy played for Aristotle in civic life.

The Constitution of the Athenians ascribed to Xenophon the orator.--The Politeia of the Spartans by Xenophon.--The Boeotian Constitution from the Oxyrhynchus historian.--The Constitution of Athens by Aristotle.

I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.

Questions about when to limit unhelpful treatments are often raised in general medicine but are less commonly considered in psychiatry. Here we describe a survey of U.S. psychiatrists intended to characterize their attitudes about the management of suicidal ideation in patients with severely treatment-refractory illness. Respondents (n = 212) received one of two cases describing a patient with suicidal ideation due to either borderline personality disorder or major depressive disorder. Both patients were described as receiving all guideline-based and plausible emerging (...) treatments. Respondents rated the expected helpfulness and likelihood of recommending each of four types of intervention: hospitalization, additional medication changes, additional neurostimulation, and additional psychotherapy. Across both cases, most respondents said they were likely to provide each intervention, except for additional neurostimulation in borderline personality disorder, while fewer thought each intervention would be helpful. Substantial minorities of respondents indicated that they would provide an intervention they did not think was likely to be helpful. Our results suggest that while most psychiatrists recognize the possibility that some patients are unlikely to be helped by available treatments, many would continue to offer such treatments. (shrink)

Little research has explored the perceptions of military medical providers in the deployed environment and how their perceptions may change over time across an extended military conflict. To our knowledge, no studies have examined military medical providers’ opinions on readiness for their roles in the post-9/11 contingency operations. What has been published indicates that, during the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military medical providers often deployed with little notice and minimal formal training. The present report examines data obtained from multiple (...) cohorts of military medical providers (N = 321) deployed to Iraq between 2005 and 2009. Despite varying degrees of support from the U.S. public, our findings indicate that U.S. Air Force military medical providers’ support for the people of Iraq, their belief in the mission, and their ability to influence change did not vary with time. (shrink)

In this study of Martin Buber's life and work, Donald Moore focuses in on Buber's central message about what it means to be a human being and a person of faith.

This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralism — whether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some (...) particular normative or political response (no). (shrink)

Elizabeth Spelke's What Babies Know is a scholarly presentation of core knowledge theory and a masterful compendium of empirical evidence that supports it. Unfortunately, Spelke's principal theoretical assumption is that core knowledge is simply the innate product of cognitive evolution. As such, her theory fails to explicate the developmental mechanisms underlying the emergence of the cognitive systems on which that knowledge depends.

Legal positivism maintains a distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be. In other words, for positivists, a law can be legally valid even if it is immoral. H. L. A. Hart hoped to defend legal positivism against natural law. This paper analyses Hart’s criticism of Gustav Radbruch, a natural lawyer, before suggesting that Hart’s account of legal positivism gives rise to a logical problem. It is concluded that this problem leaves logical space for a (...) theory of natural law based on moral authority rather than legal validity. (shrink)

Former students often thank their music teachers for what they were taught about music and about life. Play it from the Heart uses stories and concepts from music education as models for success.

For behavior analysis, ontological concerns are linked with pragmatism, rather than any stance on the inherent nature of the thing studied. Thus, behavior analysis regards as troublesome ontological commitments that formulate certain covert events as "mental" rather than behavioral because those commitments are antithetical to the effective prediction and control of natural phenomena. Moreover, a helpful recognition is that neither behavior nor environment need be publicly observable. Rather, they may be accessible to only one, but nevertheless in the behavioral dimension.

Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the intentional (...) idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verbal behavior may then enter into contingencies influencing their behavior, although the extent to which it does so varies across individuals as a function of their histories. Overall, the way that the pragmatism of radical behaviorism conceives of the nature and contribution of covert events differs appreciably from the way Professor Foxall conceives of the nature and contribution of intentional phenomena. (shrink)